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CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: BAN THE SPEECH AND
SPARE THE CHILD?-NEW YORK V. FERBER
What does child pornography have in common with advocacy of illegal-
ity, deceptive advertising, and obscenity? Each is a category of speech' that
the government may regulate despite the first amendment's proscription
against laws abridging freedom of speech.2 Prior to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in New York v. Ferber,3 speech had been deemed undeserv-
ing of first amendment protection from government regulation only when
society maintained a strong interest in preventing the harms caused, either
actually or potentially, by the speaker's words. According to the Court, ad-
vocacy of illegal action,' deceptive advertising,5 and obscenity6 have a
detrimental effect on society and, therefore, are unprotected by the first
amendment.7 In Ferber, the Court held that the first amendment did not
1. As used in this Note, the term "speech" includes any medium used to express ideas
and encompasses, in addition to the written and spoken word, films, live performances such
as plays, cartoons, and other "symbolic" forms of expression. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (live dancing); Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427
U.S. 50 (1976) (films); Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (live musical);
Papish v. University of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (political cartoon); Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of armband in protest); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas,
390 U.S. 676 (1968) (motion pictures); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)
(motion pictures). But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (display of a flag
with superimposed peace symbol held not to be expression).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
3. 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
4. Speech that advocates that the audience take illegal action, if it has a substantial likelihood
of causing imminent harm, is unprotected. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969);
see infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
5. Advertising that is false or misleading, or is in a form that could be used to deceive
the audience, is unprotected. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); see infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
6. To be obscene, material must meet each of the following criteria: (1) the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct as specifically defined by state law;
(2) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; and (3) taken as a whole, the work
does not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
7. Fighting words also have been held to be unprotected by the first amendment. Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Fighting words are defined as those "which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id.
at 572. Thus, by definition, the rationale for holding fighting words unprotected is the harm
such words cause. Nevertheless, the Court has not upheld a conviction for ighting words since
Chaplinsky. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1971) ("White son of a bitch,
I'll kill you"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("Fuck the draft"); Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("We don't need no damn flag"); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949) ("slimy scum").
Libel is another category of speech held unprotected by the first amendment. See, e.g., Time
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protect depictions of minors engaged in actual or simulated sexual activity.,
Yet, Ferber did not hold that such depictions were unprotected because of
their harmful effect on society; rather, they were declared unprotected because
they were obtained by sexually abusing and exploiting children.
The Ferber Court's decision that child pornography9 is less deserving of
first amendment protection than political speech is seemingly appropriate.'"
Nonetheless, when the rationale underlying Ferber is examined, it becomes
clear that the decision is both significant and alarming because it establishes
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (magazine incorrectly identified grounds for plaintiff's divorce);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (magazine article accused plaintiff of being
a communist); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (newspaper advertisement
criticized police reaction to civil rights movement). Generally, libel is "any publication that
is injurious to the reputation of another." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 824 (5th ed. 1979). The
theory underlying the Court's decisions holding libel unprotected is that the damage done to
an individual's reputation by libelous utterances should be compensated. Thus, as with ad-
vocacy of illegality, deceptive advertising, and obscenity, libel is unprotected because of the
harm it causes.
8. 102 S. Ct. at 3359. The New York statute upheld in Ferber criminalized promotion
of any sexual performance by a child less than 16 years of age. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15
(McKinney 1980). Because another section of the statute criminalized promotion of an obscene
sexual performance, id. § 263.10, the section attacked in Ferber clearly referred to nonobscene
depictions. The primary distinction between sexual performance by a minor and obscenity is
that the former need not appeal to prurient interests of the average person, be patently offen-
sive, or be considered in context of the whole work in order to fall within the prohibition.
102 S. Ct. at 3358; see infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of obscenity.
9. As used in this Note, the term "child pornography" refers only to nonobscene depic-
tions of minors engaging in sexual activity. This term will be used synonymously with sexual
performance by a minor, as defined by the New York statute at issue in Ferber. Sexual perfor-
mance was defined as "any play, motion picture, photograph or dance, . . . or other visual
representation exhibited before an audience" which included "actual or simulated sexual inter-
course, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or
lewd exhibition of the genitals." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263,00 (McKinney 1979).
10. Political speech is fully protected from government regulation by the first amendment.
Perhaps the clearest statement by the Supreme Court of the doctrine that political speech is
at the core of the first amendment was in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
where Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, declared that there is "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open .. " Id. at 270; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (the
first amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political and social changes"); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) ("it is a
prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste,
on all public institutions"); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance
of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive
to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principal of our constitutional system.");
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won
our independence believed . . . that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should
be a fundamental principle of the American government."). See generally Meikeljohn, The
First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (arguing that first amendment pro-
tects speech only insofar as it relates to self-government). For a discussion of the variety of
expression that has been held to be political speech, see infra note 21.
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an entirely new principle for holding speech unprotected. Prior to Ferber,
the Supreme Court uniformly justified holding a category of speech un-
protected on the theory that government has the authority to prevent cer-
tain specific harms. Thus, speech that potentially caused such harms was
subject to the government's regulatory authority. This theory allowed cen-
sorship only when the speech posed a danger to society. In contrast, the
Ferber Court justified holding child pornography unprotected because it is
the result of a societal harm: sexual exploitation of minors. The govern-
ment's authority to prevent sexual exploitation of minors for commercial
gain was held to be a sufficient justification for classifying the resultant speech
as unprotected.' Therefore, the Ferber decision expanded governmental cen-
sorship authority by permitting speech to be suppressed without requiring
proof that the speech, per se, is harmful to society. Thus, the Ferber princi-
ple eventually may erode the first amendment's protection of speech.' 2
The two divergent theories for holding speech unprotected, the pre-Ferber
"causal" theory and the Ferber "result" theory, are the subject of this Note.
Focusing on three questions, this Note will initially consider why the Court
held that child pornography, like advocacy of illegality, deceptive advertis-
ing, and obscenity, was unprotected by the first amendment. Second, this
Note will examine how Ferber differs from prior Supreme Court decisions.
Next, the impact of the Ferber decision on future first amendment adjudica-
tion will be assessed. Finally, this Note will conclude that the Court went
further than was necessary to reach the desired result in Ferber and, in so
doing, established a precedent for increased government censorship of speech.
BACKGROUND
To appreciate the significance of the Ferber decision, it is important to
have a general understanding of the Court's framework in analyzing first
amendment issues. The first amendment to the United States Constitution
II. The question presented for review was as follows: "To prevent the abuse of children
who are made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes, could the New York State
Legislature, consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit the dissemination of material which
shows children engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of whether such material is obscene?"
102 S. Ct. at 3352. Convinced that the states were entitled to regulate child pornography, the
Court answered this question in the affirmative. Id. at 3354.
12. In all of its prior decisions, the Court had concluded that the general purpose behind
the first amendment was to prohibit government censorship of speech. See, e.g., Landmark
Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (the purpose of the first amendment
is to "protect the free discussion of governmental affairs"); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809, 829 (1975) (the-policy of the first amendment favors dissemination of information and
opinion); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (the first amendment was "designed
and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion"); Red
Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (the purpose of the first amendment is
to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail"); Cur-
tis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967) (the first amendment was designed not
only to prevent government censorship, but also to prohibit any governmental action that would
prevent free and general discussion).
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provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech."' 3 Although it is well established that speech enjoys a "preferred
position" in the hierarchy of constitutionally guaranteed rights,' 4 the first
amendment does not operate as "an unlimited license to talk."'" Speech
may be subject to two kinds of government regulation. First, the govern-
ment has the authority to regulate the "time, place, or manner" of speech
so long as the regulation is not based on the content or subject matter of
the speech.' 6 For example, the government may prohibit picketing in front
of a school during school hours to prevent interference with that institu-
tion's function; 7 such a law merely regulates the time and place of the speech.
If, however, the law exempted labor picketing from the ban, it would be
unconstitutional because its application would depend on the content of the
speech. ' I
This is not to say that the government may never regulate speech based
13. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
14. Perhaps the most widely quoted source of this doctrine is a footnote in the Carolene
Products case in which Justice Stone wrote that, in contrast to regulating commerce, "[t]here
may be [a] narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legisla-
tion appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten amendments." United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
For a thorough discussion of case law creating and applying the preferred position doctrine,
see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-97 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
15. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961); see also Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 19 (1971) (the first amendment does not give absolute protection to speak wherever,
whenever, or in whatever form one chooses); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47-49
(1961) (the right of free speech, at times, may be subject to prior restraints).
16. Valid time, place and manner regulations must be content-neutral, must serve a signifi-
cant government interest, and must leave open adequate alternative channels for communica-
tion. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981);
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981); Consolidated Edison v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
554-55 (1965). The test applied to determine the validity of content-neutral regulations of sym-
bolic speech was formulated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1969). The O'Brien
test is as follows:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government in-
terest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377. See generally Cox, Foreward: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 39-48 (1980) (discussion of time, place, and manner regulations); Redish, The Con-
tent Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 123-27 (1981) (discussion
of levels of scrutiny for content-based and content-neutral regulations); Stephan, The First Amend-
ment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 214-31 (1982) (discussing the evolution
and application of the doctrine that regulations must be content-neutral).
17. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972) (ordinance banning demonstra-
tions within 150 feet of public school during school hours held constitutional).
18. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972). See generally Redish, supra note 16, at 114-21 (definition of content-based regulations).
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on its content. The Court defines the constitutionally permissible scope of
content-based regulation by holding that the first amendment either fully
protects, partially protects, or does not protect a given category of speech. 9
If a category of speech has been held fully protected, the government may
employ a content-based regulation to suppress the speech only if such a
regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and there is
no less restrictive alternative means to achieve that interest.2" For example,
political speech is fully protected.2 A law banning this type of speech would
be constitutional only if there were a compelling interest which could not
be achieved by a less restrictive alternative. Partially protected speech, such
19. See generally Stephan, supra note 16, at 211-14 (discussion of categorization of speech
into fully protected, partially protected, and unprotected categories); Stone, Restrictions of Speech
Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
81 (1978) (discussion of both content-based and content-neutral regulations); Van Alstyne, A
GRAPHIC REVIEW OF THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1982) (diagrams of
levels of protection and validity of regulations at each level).
20. This is the traditional formulation of strict judicial scrutiny, which has been said to
be "strict in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
Strict scrutiny is applied explicitly in the area of equal protection, but the Court implicitly
applies it to content-based regulations of fully protected speech by refusing to recognize asserted
state interests as sufficient to justify such regulations. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S.
45, 59-60 (1982) (interest in preserving integrity of electoral processes is not sufficiently com-
pelling to justify a restriction on candidate's offering of material benefits in exchange for votes);
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72-74 (1981) (neither the zoning power
nor the police power of a state is sufficient to justify an ordinance prohibiting live entertain-
ment); Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540-43 (1980) (prohibition
of bill inserts is not sufficiently justified by state interest in protecting a captive audience,
in allocating public resources, or in protecting ratepayers from subsidizing speech); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 464-70 (1980) (ordinance prohibiting all picketing, except labor picketing,
in residential neighborhoods is not sufficiently justified by state interest in protecting privacy,
or in protecting labor protests); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787 (1978) (or-
dinance prohibiting corporations from influencing the outcome of a vote by spending money
is not justified by state interest in protecting the role of individuals in the electoral process,
or in protecting shareholders with differing views); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 208-15 (1975) (ordinance prohibiting drive-in theatres from showing movies containing nudity
is not sufficiently justified by state interest in protecting privacy of passers-by, in protecting
children, or in regulating traffic); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)
(prohibition of armbands protesting the Vietnam War is not justified by desire to avoid discomfort
and unpleasantness).
21. A wide variety of speech has been held to be fully protected as political speech. See,
e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1975) (individuals who spend money to support
political candidates held to be engaged in protected expression of political beliefs); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969) (statement of contempt for the flag); Bond v. Floyd,
385 U.S. 116, 132 (1966) (statements criticizing the Vietnam War and the draft); Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1966) (editorial urging people to vote a certain way); Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (newspaper column criticizing a public official's performance); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965) (demonstration to protest racial segregation); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964) (advertisement criticizing police conduct in rela-
tion to the civil rights movement). But see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
304 (1974) (city could disallow political advertising on public transit system under a captive
audience rationale).
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as commercial speech,22 is protected by the first amendment from some, but
not all, content-based regulations. To satisfy the Constitution, a content-
based regulation of commercial speech must be substantially related to an
important governmental interest.2 3 Finally, a content-based regulation that
affects an unprotected category of speech is constitutional if it merely is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.2" Advocacy of illegality, decep-
tive advertising, obscenity, and child pornography have been classified as
unprotected categories of speech.
To determine the constitutionality of a content-based regulation of speech,
the Court must apply a bifurcated analysis. First, the Court must ascertain
the category of speech regulated by the challenged statute. Second, the Court
must apply the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to determine the regula-
tion's validity. Consequently, the extent to which the first amendment pro-
tects a particular category of speech is critical because less first amendment
protection permits more government censorship. Thus, by holding a category
22. The Court has defined commercial speech in various ways. See, e.g., Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (expression related solely
to economic interests of the speaker and audience); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979)
(proposal of a commercial transaction); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455
(1978) (expressions concerning purely commercial transactions); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350, 364 (1977) (speech that proposes a mundane commercial transaction); Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (speaker's in-
terest is a purely economic one); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (speech appear-
ing in the form of a paid commercial advertisement); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction).
23. The Court articulated a four part test to determine the validity of content-based regula-
tions of commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980). First, the speech must relate to a lawful transaction in a manner that
is not misleading. Second, the asserted state interest must be substantial. Third, the regulation
must directly advance the asserted state interest. Finally, the regulation must be no more restrictive
than necessary. Id. at 566. Other commercial speech cases have articulated this intermediate
level of scrutiny in slightly different ways. For example, in In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203
(1982), the Supreme Court declared that a "state must assert a substantial interest and the
interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served. . . . Restrictions must
be narrowly drawn, and the state lawfully may regulate only to the extent regulation furthers
the State's substantial interest." One year earlier, in Metromedia v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
507 (1981), the Court announced:
(1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns
lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commer-
cial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental
interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary
to accomplish the given objective.
Previously, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), the Court stated that
commercial speech is "afforded . . . a limited measure of protection commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values." Id. at 456.
24. This is commonly referred to as the rational basis test and is the minimum constitu-
tional requirement imposed on all legislation. This test merely requires that laws may not be
arbitrary or capricious. See generally Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MiNN.
L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1980); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv.* 197, 200 (1976).
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of speech unprotected, the Court gives the government constitutional authority
to enact virtually any law regulating or banning the speech within that
category. The Court's justification for holding a given category of speech
unprotected must be examined to determine if it can be reconciled with the
initial premise that governmental regulation of speech is generally
undesirable." The following analysis reveals that the Ferber decision is in-
consistent with the first amendment's goal of prohibiting censorship.
THE FERBER DECISION
Paul Ira Ferber owned a Manhattan bookstore in which, among other
items, pornographic films were sold. In March of 1978, an undercover police
officer purchased two films from Ferber. These films depicted young boys,
some of whom appeared to be no more than eight years old, masturbating
to ejaculation and engaging in conduct suggestive of oral-genital contact.16
Ferber was arrested and indicted on two counts of promoting a sexual per-
formance by a child in violation of a New York statute. 7 Ferber moved
to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the state could not prosecute him
for selling the films unless it were determined that the films were obscene. 8
The statute, Ferber claimed, was unconstitutional because it did not require
that the prohibited "performance" be obscene; thus, the statute banned the
sale of protected speech. The trial court rejected this contention, finding
that the primary legislative intent in enacting the statute was to prohibit the
use of children in pornographic films.29 In balancing Ferber's right to
disseminate concededly protected speech against the legislature's right to pro-
tect children, the trial court held that the compelling state interest in pre-
venting sexual exploitation of children prevailed, and therefore the statute
was constitutional. 30
25. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (the first amendment was designed
and intended to free the arena of public discussion from governmental restraints); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967) (the first amendment was designed not only
to prevent government censorship, but also to prohibit any governmental action which would
prevent free and general discussion).
26. Petition for Certiorari at 4-5, New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
27. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1980). The term promote is defined as "to pro-
cure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish,
distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the
same." Id. § 263.00(5).
28. 96 Misc. 2d 669, 676, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632, 637 (1978). Ferber also attacked the validity
of the statute on the grounds that it was "overly broad, vague, irrational, arbitrary, serve[d]
no legitimate state interest, [was] penally excessive and violate[d] the doctrine of equal protec-
tion of the laws." Id. at 673, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
29. Id. at 676, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (citing Memorandum in Support A-3587-C, Assemblyman
Lasher). The legislative purpose in enacting the law was "[t]o eliminate the sexual exploitation
of children by establishing strict criminal sanctions against individuals who induce children to
participate in sexual performances and who profit from the distribution of such material."
Id. at 675, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
30. Id. at 677, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 637. The New York court noted two practical points in
support of its holding. First, alternative means were available to make it appear as if children
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Ferber was convicted by a jury, and his conviction was affirmed without
opinion by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division." The New
York Court of Appeals, however, reversed Ferber's conviction and dismissed
the indictment, stating that the statute was an unconstitutional content-based
regulation of protected speech. 2 In reaching this conclusion, the court of
appeals noted that because the statute did not require that the material be
obscene, it potentially could ban speech that was fully protected by the first
amendment. 3 In addition, the New York court held that notwithstanding
the state's legitimate interest in protecting the well-being of the child per-
formers, the statute was not the least restrictive means of achieving this goal,
and therefore was unconstitutional as written.34
The state sought review of this decision, and the United States Supreme
Court granted the petition for certiorari. 5 Interestingly, none of the state's
arguments urging the Court to uphold the law suggested that nonobscene
child pornography constituted an unprotected category of speech. Instead,
the state argued that the statute was a necessary means of achieving the
state's compelling interest in protecting the welfare of its children. 6 The
statute achieved this interest, according to the state, by eliminating the
economic incentive for child exploitation that necessarily is involved in the
production of child pornography. The state further contended that the
statute was the least restrictive means of achieving this interest. If the statute
banned only obscene depictions of minors engaged in sexual activity, the
were engaging in sexual activity because young-looking adults could be filmed. Second, to allow
the state to prohibit minors from working as stagehands and, yet, deny the state authority
to forbid minors from engaging in sexual activity onstage would be anomalous. Id.
31. 74 A.D.2d 558, 424 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1980).
32. 52 N.Y.2d 674, 681, 422 N.E.2d 523, 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 866 (1981) (per curiam).
In pertinent part the court held:
IT]he statute discriminates against films and other visual portrayals of nonobscene
adolescent sex solely on the basis of their content, and since no justification has
been shown for the distinction other than special legislative distaste for the por-
trayal, the statue cannot be sustained. . . . [Tihose who present plays, films, and
books portraying adolescents cannot be singled out for punishment simply because
they deal with adolescent sex in a realistic but nonobscene manner.
Id.
33. Id. at 679, 422 N.E.2d at 525. In response to the state's contention that the obscenity
of the work was immaterial to the child performers, the court of appeals noted that the pur-
pose for censoring the protected expression was immaterial because of the impact of censorship
on first amendment freedom. Id.
34. Id. at 680-81, 422 N.E.2d at 526. For example, if the purpose was to protect New
York children, then the statute impermissibly failed to distinguish between films or photographs
taken in New York and those taken elsewhere. Id. at 679-80, 422 N.E.2d at 526. Furthermore,
if the purpose was to insure the well-being of children, then the legislature had not done so
uniformly because children were legally permitted to engage in other activities harmful to their
welfare, such as dangerous stunts. Id. at 680-81, 422 N.E.2d at 526.
35, 454 U.S. 1052 (1981).
36. Brief for Petitioner at 9, New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
37. Id. at 7-8.
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state argued, it would be ineffective to protect the children for two reasons.38
First, the prosecutorial difficulties in obtaining obscenity convictions would
not sufficiently deter traffic in child pornography to destroy the profit
motive." Second, the children who were engaged in the production of the
pornography were harmed irrespective of whether the material produced was
classified as obscene."0 Thus, the state maintained that the statute, despite
permitting a content-based regulation of fully protected speech, survived strict
scrutiny.
The Ferber Court went further than the state had urged and held that
nonobscene child pornography was an unprotected category of speech. Con-
sequently, the Court upheld the statute because it was rationally related to
a legitimate state interest."' The Ferber Court enumerated five points in
justification of its conclusion. First, the Court accepted the legislative deter-
mination that the sexual exploitation of children that occurred in the pro-
duction of child pornography seriously threatened the children's welfare.4 2
Second, the Court accepted the state's judgment that distribution of child
pornography harmed the children involved in its production regardless of
whether the material produced was obscene. 3 The third justification in Ferber
was that a ban on the sale of child pornography would eliminate the economic
incentive for producing such material.44 The Ferber Court's fourth justifica-
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id. The state attributed the prosecutorial difficulties to the uncertainties inherent in
the legal definition of obscenity. Id.
40. Id.
41. 102 S. Ct. at 3359. The Court held that the test to be applied was the Miller obscenity
test, as defined supra note 6, with the following adjustments: "A trier of fact need not find
that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that
sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue
need not be considered as a whole." 102 S. Ct. at 3358. The Court also held that the statute
was not overly broad. Id. at 3363.
42. Id. at 3354-55. Because the state's interest in protecting its children's welfare had always
been deemed compelling, the legislative purpose was held to be "a governmental objective of
surpassing importance." Id. at 3354.
43. Id. at 3355-57. The legislature had found that distribution harmed the children in two
ways. Distribution of the material to the public exacerbated the initial harm to the children
by widely disseminating a permanent record of their participation in sexual activity. Id. at 3355.
Moreover, prosecutorial efforts to enforce laws that prohibit using children to produce child
pornography would be hindered if the state could not criminalize the distribution of child por-
nography. Because the production of child pornography is a "low-profile, clandestine industry,"
probably the only effective means of enforcing laws against the production of such material
would be to "dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on
persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product." Id. at 3356.
44. Id. at 3357. The Ferber Court reasoned that the state had authority to remove the
profit motive for engaging in the illegal activity of using children to produce child pornography.
According to the Court, if the enforcement of laws against production of child pornography
were fully effective, no child pornography would be sold because none would be produced.
As a result, the first amendment impact, a ban on the sale of child pornography, would be
no greater than fully effective antiproduction laws; in both instances, no child pornography
would be sold. Id.
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tion was that any literary, scientific, or educational purpose that might be
served by depicting children engaging in sexual conduct could be served
equally as well without sexually exploiting children."' Finally, the Ferber Court
noted that its decision was consistent with precedent because other categories
of speech had been deemed unprotected solely on the basis of content.46
Taken together, these five justifications yield the conclusion that a category
of speech is unprotected if there is a state interest in preventing a harm
that occurs during the production of such speech. The Ferber Court, however,
did not address the issue of whether child pornography, once produced, has
a detrimental effect on society in general. In fact, by pointing out the poten-
tial literary, scientific, or educational value of depictions of minors engag-
ing in sexual activity, the Ferber Court implicitly conceded that such depic-
tions possibly could have a beneficial effect on an audience in certain
circumstances." ' The only relevant inquiry in Ferber was whether a ban on
the sale of child pornography would prevent children from being sexually
exploited for commercial profit. In direct contrast, the pre-Ferber decisions
which held certain speech unprotected were based solely on the speech's
detrimental effect on its audience. This justification was created and applied
uniformly in the Court's advocacy of illegality, deceptive advertising, and
obscenity decisions. Thus, Ferber allowed censorship of speech without con-
sidering whether the speech involved, in and of itself, would fall 'within the
only previously recognized exception to first amendment protection.
ADVOCACY OF ILLEGALITY
When confronted with speech that might prompt an audience to take an
illegal action that is advocated by the speaker, the Supreme Court has per-
mitted such speech to be suppressed. The evolution of case law in this area
reveals a continuing effort by the Court to define the point at which the
interest in preventing the illegal action takes precedence over the interest
in free speech. Speech that is sufficiently capable of persuading its audience
to take illegal action is harmful and therefore unprotected.
For example, in Schenck v. United States," the Court upheld Congress's
ability to criminalize advocacy of draft resistance after the United States
45. Id. at 3357-58. For example, an adult who looked like a child could be used. Alter-
natively, children could be used if the sexual conduct was merely simulated.
46. Id. at 3358. In support of this proposition, the Court cited cases which held that libel
and fighting words are unprotected. Id. (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)
(libel), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words)). The Court
articulated the circumstances under which a category of speech could be held unprotected as
those in which "it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the given classifica-
tion, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at
stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required." Id.
47. Id. at 3357.
48. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The defendants in Schenck circulated a document equating the draft
with slavery; the document urged its readers to refuse to serve in the military. The Court upheld
the defendants' convictions under the Espionage Act, reasoning that there was no first amend-
ment right to say certain things in wartime because of the probability of persuading the au-
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entered World War I. Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, ar-
ticulated the point at which speech advocating illegal action was unprotected
by the first amendment: "The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent."" 9 Because the defendant's speech in
Schenck could persuade its audience to resist the draft, and because draft
resistance was illegal, the speech was held to be unprotected by the first
amendment.
The Supreme Court also has allowed suppression of speech advocating
the overthrow of the government by force or violence. After World War
I, fear of a Communist revolution prompted Congress and many state
legislatures to enact criminal syndicalism statutes which forbade the advocacy
of force or violence as a means of political reform."0 In Dennis v. United
States," the Court upheld the validity of the federal criminal syndicalism
dience to take action that would endanger the war effort. Id. at 52. The Espionage Act, ch.
30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917), provided:
[W]hoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or
naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlist-
ment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United
States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for
not more than twenty years, or both.
249 U.S. at 52.
49. 249 U.S. at 52. Two cases decided only one week after Schenck further clarified the
clear and present danger test. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frowerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). In Debs, the Court added to the test and held that the
speaker must intend that the audience take the action urged. 249 U.S. at 215. In Frohwerk,
the Court emphasized that the clear and present danger test did not require a high degree
of probability, so long as the words were spoken in a context "where a little breath would
be enough to kindle a flame." 249 U.S. at 209; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919). In that case, Justice Holmes dissented from an affirmation of a conviction under
the Espionage Act. Holmes argued that the clear and present danger test should not be applied
if the action advocated posed only an indirect threat of illegality. Id. at 628-30 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
50. Between 1917 and 1920, 20 states and two territories enacted criminal syndicalism laws.
E. DOWELL, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL SYNDIcALIsM LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1939).
The congressional statute was typical. The Alien Registration (Smith) Act, ch. 439, § 2(a),
54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976)), provided, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United
States by force or violence.
(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons
who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any govern-
ment in the United States by force or violence; or to be or become a member
of, or affiliated with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons,: knowing
the purposes thereof.
Id.
51. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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statute and affirmed the defendants' convictions under that statute. The defen-
dants had been prosecuted for organizing the Communist Party of the United
States of America. The Court reasoned that the Communist Party advocated
violent overthrow of government,52 and even though the probability of suc-
cess was doubtful and the likelihood of an immediate attempt was remote,
the harm that would result from a successful Communist revolution was
so great that the government could suppress the advocacy of this illegal
action.53 Accordingly, because it might have had a cumulative effect over
time of persuading audiences to rise up against the government, the speech
was held unprotected.1
4
When the country no longer perceived the threat of a Communist revolu-
tion as serious, the Supreme Court retreated from its Dennis holding.
Although the Court continued to uphold criminal syndicalism laws, the later
decisions distinguished between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy
of illegal action." In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 6 the Court declared that speech
could be suppressed only if it was aimed at inciting illegal action. 7 In strik-
ing down Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, the Brandenburg Court drew
a line between protected and unprotected advocacy of illegality. Advocacy
of illegality was unprotected only if it was "directed to inciting or produc-
52. Id. at 497-98. The Court found that
the Communist Party is a highly disciplined organization, adept at infiltration into
strategic positions, use of aliases, and double-meaning language; that the Party is
rigidly controlled; that Communists, unlike other political parties, tolerate no dissen-
sion from the policy laid down by the guiding forces; [that] the literature of the
Party and the statements and activities of its leaders ... advocate, and the general
goal of the Party was, during the period in question, to achieve a successful over-
throw of the existing order by force and violence ...
Id. at 498.
53. Id. at 509.
54. Accord Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1961) (affirming a conviction
under the Smith Act for holding membership in the Communist Party); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1927) (affirming a conviction under a criminal syndicalism statute for
being a member of the Communist Party); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925)
(affirming a conviction under a criminal syndicalism statute for writing and publishing documents
advocating socialism). Contra Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261 (1937) (reversing a convic-
tion under a criminal syndicalism statute for soliciting members for the Communist Party);
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (reversing a conviction under a criminal syn-
dicalism statute for taking part in an otherwise lawful meeting of the Communist Party).
55. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 321-22 (1957). Both cases involved convictions under the Smith Act for member-
ship in the Communist Party.
56. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 447. Addressing a Ku Klux Klan rally, Brandenburg stated: "We're not a revengent
[sic] organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to sup-
press the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance
taken." Id. at 446. The Court reversed Brandenburg's conviction under Ohio's criminal syn-
dicalism statute, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (Page 1954) (repealed 1974), on grounds
that the statute unconstitutionally failed to distinguish between "mere advocacy" and "incite-
ment to imminent lawless action." 395 U.S. at 449.
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ing imminent lawless action and [was] likely to incite or produce such
action.""8
In all of the advocacy of illegality cases, the Court held the speech un-
protected when it determined that the speech might cause a significant harm.
Although the requisite strength of the causal connection fluctuated over time,
the principle unifying all of these cases was that government possessed the
authority to suppress speech in order to prevent the harm that the particular
speech might cause. To prevent draft resistance and the violent overthrow
of government, the government was authorized to regulate speech that at-
tempted to persuade audiences to take such action. The first amendment,
therefore, did not restrain the government from regulating speech which could
lead to a harm that the government had an interest in preventing.
DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
Generally, commercial speech, speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction,59 is afforded partial protection under the first
amendment.6" The justification for providing protection for commercial speech
arises from society's interest in disseminating accurate information to in-
dividuals, thereby enabling them to make economic decisions in an intelligent
manner.' Inaccurate or misleading information would frustrate this interest
and, therefore, the Court has held that deceptive advertising is unprotected. 2
In so holding, the Court has relied on the principle that government possesses
the authority to regulate advertising in order to prevent any harm, such as
consumer fraud, that is caused by commercial speech.
Originally, the Court maintained the position that commercial speech was
protected if it was truthful and did not mislead consumers. Thus, in Bates
v. State Bar,63 the Court held the application of a disciplinary rule prohibiting
58. 395 U.S. at 447. The Court applied this test in Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414
U.S. 441, 447 (1974) (striking down a statute requiring political parties seeking office to take
an oath), and in Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (reversing a conviction for yelling
"We'll take the fucking street later (or again)" during an antiwar demonstration).
59. Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
60. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). This
protection, however, did not exist until recently. For example, commercial speech was held
unprotected in Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), and continued to be unprotected
until Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). See, e.g., Pittsburg Press v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)
(discriminatory want ads are not protected). But see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)
(advertisement for abortion services is protected); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (political speech did not lose its first amendment protection because it appeared in the
form of a paid advertisement).
61. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 764-65 (1976) (pharmacists advertising prescription drug prices).
62. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200, 203 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
383 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
63. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
19831
698 DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:685
attorney advertising 64 to be violative of the first amendment." The Court
reasoned that the information conveyed in the advertisement was protected
because it was truthful and served the consumer's need for information con-
cerning legal services.
66
A year later, however, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 67 the
Court modified its position in Bates. Ohralik was a licensed attorney who
was suspended from practice for violating a disciplinary rule that prohibited
in-person solicitation of clients for pecuniary gain.66 Although it was not
alleged that any of the information conveyed by Ohralik to his potential
clients was false or deceptive, the Court held that the disciplinary rule was
a legitimate prophylactic measure designed to prevent fraud, undue influence,
and public intimidation. 69 Focusing on the form (in-person solicitation) used
64. ARIZ. DR 2-101(B) (incorporated in ARIZ. SuP. CT. R. 29 (a), 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 26 (Supp. 1976)). The rule provided in part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine adver-
tisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or
telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize
or permit others to do so in his behalf.
Id.
65. 433 U.S. at 384. In Bates, a group of attorneys formed a legal clinic that offered "routine
services." The attorneys placed a newspaper advertisement describing the types of services available
and the fees charged for these services. The advertisement stated that the clinic offered "legal
services at very reasonable fees" and proceeded to enumerate the services available: "Divorce
or legal separation-uncontested"; "Preparation of all court papers and instructions on how
to do your own simple uncontested divorce"; "Adoption-uncontested severance proceeding";
"Bankruptcy-non-business, no contested proceedings"; "Change of Name"; and "Informa-
tion regarding other types of cases furnished on request." Id. at 385 app. The state bar association
charged the attorneys with violation of the disciplinary rule.
66. Id. at 372-75. Other justifications asserted in support of the disciplinary rule were the
adverse effects of attorney advertising on professionalism, on administration of justice, on fees,
and on the quality of service. The Court rejected each of these assertions, finding that "[none]
of the proffered justifications rise[s] to the level of acceptable reason for the suppression of
all advertising by attorneys." Id. at 379.
67. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
68. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A), DR 2-104(A) (1970). DR
2-103(A) provides: "A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of
himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding
employment of a lawyer." DR 2-104(A) provides: "A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice
to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment
resulting from that advice .. "
Ohralik had heard about a car accident and visited one of the victims, an 18-year-old girl,
in the hospital, where she lay in traction. He suggested that he represent her in a claim against
the insurance company. When she demurred, Ohralik visited her parents with a concealed tape
recorder, persuaded them to retain his services, and then returned to the hospital to have the
daughter sign a contract of employment.
Ohralik also visited the other victim, also an 18-year-old girl, at her home, again with a
concealed tape recorder. She orally agreed to allow Ohrafik to represent her in a claim against
the insurance company. Both girls later repudiated their agreements. 436 U.S. at 449-52.
69. 436 U.S. at 464.
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to convey the information, the Court held that if the form has an inherent
potential to deceive, the speech is unprotected."0 Accordingly, the Ohralik
Court was unwilling to extend first amendment protection to harmful com-
mercial speech, even if the harm caused by such speech was merely potential. 7'
Subsequently, this unwillingness to extend first amendment protection to
deceptive advertising led the Supreme Court to hold that even when speech
conveyed no information, it could be banned if it had the potential to
defraud. In Friedman v. Rogers,72 the Court upheld a statute that prohibited
the practice of optometry under a trade name73 because such trade names,
though in and of themselves meaningless, could be manipulated in a variety
of ways to deceive the public.7" As it had done in Ohralik, the Court in Fried-
man focused on the form of speech and its potential to deceive, rather than
on the information conveyed by the speech. In both Friedman and Ohralik,
the Court deferred to the legislatures' conclusions that a form of commer-
cial advertising could defraud consumers. Because the first amendment does
not protect deceptive commercial speech, the Court reasoned, such speech
is subject to rational regulations aimed at preventing consumer fraud.
The deceptive advertising cases are analogous to the advocacy of illegality
cases; both involve speech that has the potential to cause harm to society.
The first amendment protects these types of speech only to the extent that
their potential for harm is insignificant. When speech threatens a significant
societal interest, however, the first amendment ceases to protect the speech
from governmental regulation.7"
OBSCENITY
The Court has struggled with obscenity more than with any other category
of unprotected speech, primarily because obscenity has been so difficult to
define." Yet, the Court never has swayed from its conviction that obscenity,
70. Id. at 464-66.
71. But cf In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (disciplinary rule prohibiting attorneys from
advertising certain information held violative of the first amendment); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978) (letter advising a layman that free legal advice was available from the ACLU held
protected by the first amendment); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that at-
torney advertising of "routine services" is protected speech).
72. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
73. Tax. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-5.13(d) (Vernon 1969).
74. 440 U.S. at 12. The Court noted that, over time, the public associates a trade name
with a certain price and quality of service. Consequently, trade names could be manipulated
in a variety of ways to deceive the public. As an example of such manipulation, the Court
pointed out that the staff of optometrists could be changed, thereby changing the quality of
service, even though the trade name remained the same. Id. at 12-13.
75. But see Linmark Assoc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (state interest in preventing
"white flight" held insufficient to justify ban on residential "For Sale" signs).
76. Between 1957 and 1968, there were a total of 55 separate opinions filed in 13 obscenity
decisions. Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 705 n.1 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(same opinion served as concurrence of Harlan, J., in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968)).
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however it may be defined, is totally outside the protection of the first
amendment.77 Although never explicitly stating its justification for holding
obscenity unprotected, the Court repeatedly has stressed that obscenity is
unprotected because it has no "redeeming social value"; 78 this factor,
however, should not support a denial of first amendment protection. Many
Supreme Court decisions emphasize that the first amendment does not per-
mit government to assess the worth or importance of speech that it seeks
to regulate." The rationale for placing obscenity beyond the scope of the
first amendment is revealed by examining the various definitions of obscenity
formulated by the Court."0 Under each of these definitions, material is
classified as obscene only if it appeals to a prurient interest in sex. This
standard implicitly assumes that it is harmful to appeal to the prurient in-
terests of an audience. Consequently, by definition, obscenity causes a harm
to society which renders this type of speech unprotected by the first
amendment.
The Court first held that obscenity was unprotected speech in Roth v.
United States.8' Roth was a New York book publisher convicted of mailing
77. Justices Black and Douglas, however, never accepted this view. See Paris Adult Theater
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 42-43 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 517 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Black & Douglas, J.J.,
concurring in judgment); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (Douglas & Black, J.J.,
dissenting).
78. Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 774 (1977); Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 598
(1977); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
24, 26 (1973); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
79. In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Justice Holmes forcefully argued that
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. . . . [W]e
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death. ...
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
(1978) (corporation held to be a speaker); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("Fuck
the Draft"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (obscenity); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (magazine stories about bloody crimes).
80. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (obscenity is material that depicts or
describes sexual conduct and which, taken as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex,
portrays the conduct in a patently offensive way, and has no serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1960) (obscenity is material the dominant theme of which,
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests in sex in a patently offensive way, as judged
by contemporary community standards, and which is utterly without redeeming social value);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (obscenity is material that deals with sex in
a manner appealing to prurient interests).
81. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (consolidated with Alberts v. California). Alberts was a challenge
to a state obscenity statute.
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obscene literature in violation of federal law. 2 In upholding Roth's convic-
tion, the majority provided little insight into why obscenity was unprotected,
other than noting that obscenity never had been presumed to be protected. 3
By defining obscenity as "material which deals with sex in a manner ap-
pealing to prurient interest," 84 however, the Roth Court implicitly held that
obscenity was unprotected because it appealed to prurient interests. Justice
Harlan, in a concurring opinion, elaborated on the justification for denying
first amendment protection to obscenity. He noted that a state could con-
clude rationally that obscenity "can induce a type of sexual conduct which
a State may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of society.""
Having determined in Roth that obscenity was unprotected, the Court spent
the next twelve years refining its definition of obscenity and determining
whether particular speech was obscene. During this period, the Court failed
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952).
83. 354 U.S. at 484.
84. Id. at 487. Roth had contended that the obscenity statute was unconstitutional because
it "punish[ed] incitation to impure sexual thoughts, not shown to be related to any overt anti-
social conduct which is or may be incited in the persons stimulated to such thoughts." Id.
at 485-86 (emphasis in original). The Court rejected this contention and held that the statute
was constitutional because obscenity was not protected by the first amendment. Id. at 487.
Then, the Court defined obscenity as material that appeals to prurient interests in sex, but
failed to explain the distinction between "incitation to impure sexual thoughts" and "appeals
to prurient interests in sex." Roth articulated the proper test for judging whether material is
obscene as follows: "[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests."
Id. at 489.
85. Id. at 501-02 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan conceded that exposure to such
material might not cause a person to engage in this type of conduct immediately. Nevertheless,
according to Justice Harlan, obscenity could be regulated because "over a long period of time
the indiscriminate dissemination of materials, the essential character of which is to degrade
sex, [might] have an eroding effect on moral standards." Id. at 502. Justice Harlan's dissent
from the majority's holding in Roth was based on his belief that the government interests
served by obscenity statutes were the exclusive province of state legislatures and not the federal
government. Id. at 504. Therefore, his dissent was simultaneously a concurrence in Alberts
v. California, which involved a state obscenity regulation.
86. In Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), the Court began to
retreat from its broad language in Roth, and drew a distinction between obscenity and ad-
vocacy of immoral ideas by holding that a film which portrayed adultery as proper behavior
under certain circumstances was constitutionally protected. Id. at 688. In Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964), the Court attempted to make the Roth test easier to apply by defining
"contemporary community standards" in terms of national standards. 1d. at 195.
The Court formulated a new, three part test for obscenity in A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). This new test re-
quired that: (1) "the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal[ ] to a prurient
interest in sex"; (2) "the material [be) patently offensive because it affronts contemporary com-
munity standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters"; and (3) "the
material [be] utterly without redeeming social value." Id. at 418. Justice Harlan began to realize
the difficulty of applying any test for obscenity, notwithstanding attempts to make the test
more objective, and noted that case-by-case adjudication by the Supreme Court was inescapable.
Id. at 460 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Court again endeavored to make the test for obscenity easier to apply in Ginzberg v.
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to identify further the reason why obscenity was unprotected; apparently,
the Court was content with Justice Harlan's conclusion in Roth that obscenity
caused antisocial conduct, and, therefore, was not entitled to first amend-
ment protection.
Yet, in Stanley v. Georgia,87 decided twelve years after Roth, the Court
rejected Justice Harlan's justifications for holding obscenity unprotected.
Stanley was convicted of possessing obscene material in his home.88 The Court
reversed his conviction, finding that none of the asserted state interests
justified the violation of Stanley's fundamental right to privacy.89 The state
asserted that obscenity caused moral corruption and that states had the right
to protect their citizens from immorality. 0 The Stanley Court, however, held
that the state had no authority to control an individual's private thoughts.'
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In that case, the Court held that the context in which
the material was sold could be considered in determining whether it was obscene. Thus, "com-
mercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal" could render material
obscene. Id. at 465-66.
In Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), the Court modified the prurient appeal re-
quirement by permitting material to be judged in terms of its "intended and probable recipient
group." Id. at 509. The Mishkin Court also tried to "compensate for the ambiguities inherent
in the definition of obscenity" by requiring proof of scienter. Id. at 511.
Finally, in Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), the Court reversed a conviction for
the sale of obscenity, holding that the material at issue was not obscene, but failing to explain
why. This set the precedent for four years of "Redrupping" in which 28 convictions were
reversed. Under this procedure, if at least five justices, applying whatever test they wished,
found the material not to be obscene, the conviction was reversed without opinion. See Weiner
v. California, 404 U.S. 988 (1971); Harstein v. Missouri, 404 U.S. 988 (1971); Burgin v. South
Carolina, 404 U.S. 806 (1971); Bloss v. Michigan, 402 U.S. 938 (1971); Childs v. Oregon,
401 U.S. 1006 (1971); Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S.
434 (1970); Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970);
Henry v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); Felton v. City of Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968);
Robert-Arthur Management Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 578 (1968); I.M. Amusement Corp.
v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968); Chance v. California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967); Central Magazine
Sales v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Conner v. City of Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967);
Potomac News v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967); Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454
(1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Books,
Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Avan-
sino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Cobert
v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967); Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967); Friedman v.
New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967).
87. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
88. The materials were found in the course of an authorized search of Stanley's home for
evidence of bookmaking activities. Id. at 558.
89. Id. at 568. The fundamental right of privacy was first recognized as a constitutionally
protected right in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to use contraceptives).
90. 394 U.S. at 565. The state argued that it had the ability to protect its citizens' bodies
from the harmful effects of such things as narcotics, illegal firearms, and intoxicating liquor
by prohibiting the "mere knowing possession" of such items. Brief for Appellee 26-27, Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). It would be anomalous, the state asserted, for the state to
have constitutional authority to protect the bodies of its citizens, but be denied the power
to protect their minds by prohibiting the "mere knowing possession" of obscenity. Id. at 27.
91. 394 U.S. at 566. In an often quoted passage, Justice Marshall wrote that "[ilf the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone
in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." Id. at 565.
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Consistent with Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Roth, the state also
asserted that it had authority to regulate obscenity in order to prevent the
resultant antisocial conduct.92 The Stanley Court rejected this contention,
concluding that the claimed causal connection between obscenity and anti-
social conduct was unsubstantiated. 93 Thus, Stanley effectively rejected both
of Roth's justifications for holding obscenity unprotected and, apparently,
established a precedent for overruling Roth. 9
Nonetheless, in Miller v. California,95 the Court reaffirmed that obscenity
was unprotected, thereby reaffirming the position maintained in Roth. The
Miller Court did not explain its reason for doing so, but as in Roth, merely
stated that obscenity appealed to prurient interests in sex.96 Consequently,
Miller implicitly concluded that obscenity lacked first amendment protection
because of the harm caused by obscene material.
This conclusion was affirmed by the Court's holding in Paris Adult Theater
I v. Slaton.97 In that case, the state sought an injunction to prevent a public
theater from exhibiting obscene films. To prevent unwilling adults from be-
ing exposed to such material, the theater had excluded minors and posted
warnings as to the nature of the films.98 The Court, however, concluded
92. Id. at 566.
93. Id. at 567. In support of this conclusion, the Court stated that "in the context of private
consumption of ideas and information we should adhere to the view that '[almong free men,
the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for viola-
tions of the law .... ' " Id. at 566-67 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927)
(Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., concurring)).
94. See Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (D. Mass. 1969) ("restricted distribu-
tion [of obscenity], adequately controlled, is no longer to be condemned"), vacated and remanded
per curiam on other grounds, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). Several contemporaneous law review ar-
ticles also predicated that Stanley marked the beginning of the end of Roth. See, e.g., Com-
ment, Stanley v. Georgia: New Directions in Obscenity Regulation?, 48 TEx. L. REV. 646 (1970)
(by giving obscenity any first amendment protection, the Stanley Court rejected the notion
that a category of speech either is or is not protected); Note, Constitutional Law-First Amend-
ment: The New Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1257 (1969) (Stanley's
rejection of the governmental interests previously asserted to justify laws banning the sale of
obscenity implies that such laws are unconstitutional after Stanley); Note, The Supreme Court,
1968 Term: Private Possession of Obscene Material, 83 HARV. L. REV. 147 (1969) (Stanley
implies that obscenity can be banned only when it is a nuisance to others); Note, Stanley v.
Georgia: A First Amendment Approach to Obscenity Control, 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 364 (1970)
(the unanswered question is whether the same state interests rejected in Stanley can support
general obscenity laws).
95. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller was convicted for mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material
in violation of state law. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a) (West Supp. 1961).
96. 413 U.S. at 24. In Miller, the Court attempted to deal with the inherent vagueness
of obscenity regulation by requiring that state laws specifically define the types of sexual con-
duct that would be illegal to depict or describe. To guide state legislatures, the opinion listed
the following examples of acceptable regulations: "Patently offensive representations or descrip-
tions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated"; and "Patently offen-
sive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition
of the genitals." Id. at 25.
97. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
98. The theatre had a single entrance and no pictures on the outside. Signs were posted
indicating that the theatre exhibited "Atlanta's Finest Mature Feature Films." The entrance
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that this was not enough to exempt the material from state regulation.99
The Paris Court held that the societal interest in preventing moral corrup-
tion, which could lead to crime or other antisocial conduct, justified holding
obscenity unprotected.'
The Court's decisions in the obscenity cases can be summarized by the
following syllogism: the first amendment does not protect speech that causes
societal harm; moral corruption and antisocial behavior are societal harms;
obscenity causes moral corruption and antisocial behavior; therefore, obscenity
is unprotected by the first amendment. Although the evils of obscenity are
far more nebulous, and far less susceptible to empirical proof than the evils
caused by advocacy of illegality and deceptive advertising, the Court's ra-
tionale for holding all three categories unprotected has been that the state
can regulate such speech in order to prevent the societal harm it causes.
In each of the three categories, an evil inherent in the publication of the
speech has justified its regulation. All of the cases within these categories
involved speech which directly tends to harm society. Thus, it was solely
for this reason that the speech in these cases was held to be unprotected
by the first amendment.
The Court's decision in Ferber appears to be inconsistent with these prior
opinions. The Ferber Court focused only on the harm involved in the pro-
duction of child pornography and completely failed to consider whether the
speech that resulted from the finished product was harmful to society. The
causal theory applied prior to Ferber limited the government's censorship
had a sign that stated: "Adult Theatre-You must be 21 and able to prove it. If viewing the
nude body offends you, Please Do Not Enter." Id. at 52.
99. Id. at 57. Apparently in order to avoid overruling Stanley, the Court stressed the public
and commercial aspects involved in Paris by declaring: "The States have the power to make
a morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such
material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public safety,
or to jeopardize ... the States' right . . . to maintain a decent society.' " Id. at 69 (citing
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). Nevertheless, Paris
implicitly overruled the interpretation of Stanley provided in Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp.
1363 (D. Mass. 1969) (granting a preliminary injunction against prosecution for public exhibi-
tion of the film I Am Curious (Yellow)), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds,
401 U.S. 216 (1971).
100. Specifically, the Court reasoned:
If we accept the unprovable assumption that a complete education requires the reading
of certain books, . . . and the well nigh universal belief that good books, plays,
and art lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop
character, can we then say that a state legislature may not act on the corollary
assumption that commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions focused on obscene
conduct, have a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to
antisocial behavior? ...The sum of experience, . . .affords an ample basis for
legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, cen-
tral to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality,
can be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex. Nothing in
the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching such a conclusion and acting on
it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive evidence or empirical data.
413 U.S. at 63.
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power to exigent circumstances, and thus was consistent with the first amend-
ment's goal of protecting free speech. Moreover, the Court's application of
this theory was confined within narrow limits. Ferber's rationale considered
the speech only insofar as it was the result of a harm. This rationale is
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the high value previously placed
upon freedom of speech. Beyond this theoretical inconsistency, Ferber
establishes a dangerous precedent; its effect on future first amendment ad-
judication might render the guarantee of free speech merely rhetorical.
IMPACT OF FERBER
The Ferber Court's decision to exempt child pornography from first amend-
ment protection permits the government to suppress speech for purposes
unrelated to any societal harm caused by the speech itself. While it is possi-
ble that the principle announced in Ferber will be limited to child por-
nography, to determine its validity, this principle must be tested by examin-
ing its possible implications. The Ferber principle, in its most general terms,
is that government can censor speech which is the result of a societal harm
that government has the authority to prevent.
The following discussion proposes a series of hypothetical situations to
which the Ferber principle might be applied. While these hypotheticals might
extend Ferber beyond its intended scope, ' the purpose of this discussion
is to test the validity of its principle.' °2 Additionally, this exercise will
demonstrate that a broad application of the Ferber principle would contravene
the purposes of the first amendment by subjecting virtually all speech to
content-based regulation.
101. It is not unusual for a holding ostensibly limited to the facts of a particular case to
be applied to very dissimilar factual situations. In the context of the first amendment, the
most striking example of this tendency has been the clear and present danger test. This test
was formulated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), and appeared, on its
face, to be limited to advocacy of illegality: "The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
Id. Since Schenck, however, the clear and present danger test has been applied in reviewing
the validity of government regulation of a wide variety of categories of speech. See, e.g., Kingsley
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) (film portraying adultery as desirable
in certain circumstances); Pennekemp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946) (criticism of pend-
ing litigation); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (urging audience to join a labor
union).
Another example in which an apparently limited holding was applied in factually diverse
circumstances is the intermediate level of scrutiny held to apply to gender-based discrimination
challenged under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court held: "To withstand constitutional challenge. . . . classifica-
tions by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197. Nevertheless, the Court adopted this test as
the appropriate one to be applied in commercial speech cases. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
102. Because the speech involved in each of the proposed hypotheticals is harmless in and
of itself, it would be fully protected under the pre-Ferber principle.
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Assume, for example, that a movie contains one scene in which the actors
engage in homosexual activity, or one scene in which the actors engage in
oral sex, or one scene in which a male and female who are not married
to each other have sexual intercourse. Assume further that the scene is done
in a manner that does not appeal to prurient interests, but that the actors
actually engage in the conduct depicted. Many states have laws criminaliz-
ing homosexuality, oral sex, or extramarital and premarital sex, even be-
tween consenting adults.' °3 Such laws are based on the assumption that the
prohibited conduct is harmful to the moral welfare of the participants." '
Just as Ferber permitted the state to ban films depicting minors engaged
in sexual activity in order to protect those minors, Ferber's rationale similarly
would permit the state to ban the hypothetical movie in order to protect
the actors.' °5 Thus, Ferber would allow this otherwise fully protected form
of speech, the movie, to be banned in order to prevent the harm that occur-
red in its production, even if the movie had serious artistic, political, scien-
tific, or educational value.
Ferber also might be extended to allow suppression of films in which a
dangerous stunt is performed. The state, of course, has a clear and compel-
103. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (deviate sexual intercourse); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (Supp. 1978) ("the infamous crimes against nature"; lewd and lascivious
acts); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977) (sodomy); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-3502 (West 1967)
(sodomy); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976) (unnatural and lascivious acts); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-2002 (1983) (sodomy); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979) (sodomy and other "unnatural"
acts); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1981) (sodomy); Ky. REV. STAT. § 510.100 (1974) (homosex-
uality); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:89, 14:89.1 (West Supp. 1983) (homosexuality and bestial-
ity); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 27-553, 27-554 (1982) (sodomy, oral sex, and bestiality); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 34, 35 (Michie/ Law. Co-op. 1970) (homosexuality and bestiality);
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.158, 750.338, 750.338(a) (1968) (homosexuality); MINN. STAT. §
609.293 (1980) (sodomy); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972) (homosexuality and bestiality);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979) (premarital intercourse before age of 17 and homosex-
uality); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1981) (homosexuality); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1977)
(homosexuality); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:143-1 (West 1969) (homosexuality); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.38 (McKinney 1975) (sodomy); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969) (sodomy); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983) (sodomy); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3124 (Purdon Supp.
1980) (deviate sexual intercourse); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1969) (crimes against nature);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (sodomy); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612
(1982) (sodomy and oral sex); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974) (homosexuality);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (Supp. 1977) (sodomy); VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1982) (sodomy
and oral sex); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West 1982) (sodomy and oral sex). See generally
Katz, Sexual Morality and the Constitution: People v. Onofre, 46 ALB. L. REV. 311 (1982)
(survey of Supreme Court precedents which would support holding that private consensual
homosexuality is constitutional); Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexuals in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 942-47 (1979) (discussing statutes
criminalizing homosexuality); Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Laws, 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 553 (1976) (discussing private consensual sodomy).
104. Allen, Majorities, Minorities, and Morals: Penal Policy and Consensual Behavior, 9
N. Ky. L. REv. 1, 4 (1982).
105. Under Ferber the material need not be considered as a whole in order to ban the entire
work; one scene in which harmful conduct was presented would be sufficient. 102 S. Ct. at 3358.
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ling interest in protecting the life of its citizens.' °6 Many stunts seriously
endanger the lives of the performers. Ferber's rationale would allow the state
to ban a film in order to prevent actors from performing dangerous stunts.
Just as child pornography necessarily is produced by exploiting children sex-
ually, stunt scenes necessarily are produced by endangering the lives of the
actors performing the stunts. Ferber allowed censorship of the resultant speech
as a means of preventing the harm necessary to its production; this rationale
would allow government to censor a film containing a dangerous stunt as
a means of preventing the harm entailed in its production.
Furthermore, in its broadest interpretation, the Ferber rationale could be
applied to written, as well as visual, forms of expression. For instance, sup-
pose a newspaper publisher pays its employees less than minimum wages.
Society has an interest in assuring the economic welfare-of its citizens, and
this interest is served by requiring employers to pay minimum wages.' 7 Yet,
it might be economically advantageous for an employer to pay substandard
wages in an effort to increase profits. The Ferber rationale would allow the
state to suppress the newspapers produced by this hypothetical publisher in
order to eliminate the economic incentive for paying substandard wages. In
Ferber, the sale of child pornography provided an economic motive for sex-
ually exploiting children; the Court held that banning the sale of such speech
was justified by the state's interest in the welfare of its children. Similarly,
the desire to maximize profits from the sale of newspapers provides an
economic motive for publishers to pay substandard wages. Ferber's rationale,
therefore, would justify a ban on the sale of newspapers in order to serve
the state's interest in the economic welfare of its citizens.
To illustrate further, suppose a book publisher refuses to hire any member
of a minority, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.'10 Title VII
was enacted to ensure equal employment opportunities to people of all
races.' 9 This publisher's books would be the products of his denial of equal
opportunity to minorities. The Ferber principle is based on the premise that
illegal activity can be deterred by banning the products which result from
that activity. By analogy, government could forbid the publication of this
publisher's books in order to prevent the racially discriminatory way in which
they were produced. Under this logic, the social value of the books themselves
would be irrelevant in determining whether they were protected by the first
amendment.
106. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (state has an important and legitimate in-
terest in protecting potential life).
107. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (19761. Congress declared
the policy of the Act to be the "maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary
for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers .. " Id. § 202(a).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) (it is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire
any person because of race).
109. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2391, 2401. That report stated that the congressional purpose in enacting Title VII was
the elimination of employment discrimination based on race.
1983]
708 DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:685
Finally, if taken to its logical extreme, Ferber could be applied to sup-
press the reporting of certain news events. Consider the following situation:
a man calls a television station requesting that a camera crew be sent to
a certain place at a certain time, where he intends to set himself on fire
to demonstrate his dissatisfaction with a particular governmental policy.'"
The intended protest clearly is to be staged for the media in an effort to
reach the widest possible audience. Most would agree that society has an
interest in preventing people from setting themselves on fire. Therefore, if
the station complies with the man's request and films the event, Ferber seems
to allow the government to prevent the station from showing the film in
order to prevent people from staging similar protests. By suppressing the
film, government could eliminate much of the incentive for this form of
protest.
In each of the preceeding hypotheticals, Ferber could be applied to censor
speech, even though the speech otherwise would be protected from censor-
ship by the first amendment. The principle announced in Ferber allows the
state to ban any speech which is the result of an action considered harmful
to society. This principle not only gives the government wide latitude to sup-
press speech, but also elevates other interests to the "preferred position"
previously held solely by the interest in protecting free speech.'" In con-
trast, the pre-Ferber principle that speech only could be suppressed if it caused
a societal harm, would protect the speech in all of the preceding hypotheticals
because the speech itself was harmless. Therefore, the principle announced
in Ferber sanctions government censorship that previously would have been
unconstitutional.
A CONSISTENT ALTERNATIVE TO FERBER
Not only did Ferber's innovative holding establish a dangerous precedent,
but it did so unnecessarily. The Court could have reached its conclusion
that government can suppress child pornography by using the rationale
employed in the obscenity cases.' 2 By modifying the definition of obscenity
to include material that appeals to the prurient interests of pedophiles,' 3
though not of the average person, child pornography would have been held
unprotected solely because of its impact on the audience.
This proposal is not unprecedented. In two major obscenity cases, the
Supreme Court similarly expanded the definition of obscenity. In Mishkin
v. New York, ' 4 the defendant was convicted of hiring authors to write por-
nographic books which he then sold. Mishkin had instructed the authors
110. This hypothetical is based on a true story which was reported in the New York Times.
See N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1983, at Al, col.2.
11l. See supra note 14.
112. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
113. A pedophile is "one affected with ... [a] sexual perversion in which children are the
preferred sexual object." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 838 (8th ed. 1981).
114. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
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to include lurid descriptions of homosexuality and sado-masochism." 5 In af-
firming Mishkin's conviction, the Court noted that the books probably would
not appeal to the prurient interests of the "average person, applying con-
temporary community standards,'"" 6 because the books clearly were aimed
at appealing to the prurient interests of "deviant sexual groups."' 7 Never-
theless, the Court concluded that the books were obscene. ' The Mishkin
Court reached this conclusion by modifying the obscenity definition for this
type of material, and judging it in terms of its prurient appeal to "its in-
tended and probable recipient group.""' 9 Because the material was aimed
at, and primarily purchased by, people who found it to be erotic, it was
deemed obscene for its appeal to its audience's prurient interests.
The second case in which the Court expanded the definition of obscenity
was Ginsberg v. New York. 20 Ginsberg was convicted under a state statute
that criminalized the sale of obscenity to minors. The statute defined obscenity
in terms of its appeal to the prurient interests of minors.'' The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the statute, reasoning that the state could conclude
rationally that material which was not necessarily harmful to adults could
be harmful to minors.' 22 The state's interest in the well-being of children
115. The Court cited the testimony of two authors hired by Mishkin. The first testified that
he was instructed to make the books "full of sex scenes and lesbian scenes .... [T]he sex
had to be very strong, it had to be rough, it had to be clearly spelled out. . . . I had to
write sex very bluntly, make the sex scenes very strong .... [Tlhe sex scenes had to be unusual
sex scenes between men and women, women and women, and men and men .... [H]e wanted
scenes in which women were making love with women. . . . [H]e wanted sex scenes . .. in
which there were lesbian scenes. He didn't call it lesbian, but he described women making
love to women and men ... and making love to men, and there were spankings and scenes-
sex in an abnormal and irregular fashion." The second author testified that he was instructed
"to deal very graphically with . .. the darkening of the flesh under flagellation. ... Id.
at 505 (brackets & ellipses in original).
116. Id. at 508-09. For a discussion of the average person test which was first articulated
in Roth, see supra note 84.
117. 383 U.S. at 508-09. Mishkin never alleged that the books were not intended to appeal
to prurient interests of "sexually deviant groups," and the Court found the proof that they
were so intended to be compelling. Id. at 509-10.
118. Id. at 510.
119. Id. at 509. Because the purpose of Roth's "average person" requirement was held to
be a rejection of the English "most susceptible person" standard for judging obscenity, the
Court reasoned that Mishkin was not inconsistent with Roth. Id. at 508-09.
120. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
121. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965). The statute criminalized the sale of material
which was harmful to minors and defined "material harmful to minors" as
that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sex-
ual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole
with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
Id.
122. 390 U.S. at 643. The legislature had concluded that "girlie" magazines were harmful
to the ethical and moral development of minors. Id. at 641.
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was at least legitimate, if not compelling. '23 Therefore, the Ginsberg Court
sustained the statute under the rational basis test applied to unprotected
categories of speech. 11
Both Mishkin and Ginsberg were reaffirmed in Miller.2 ' The Miller Court
held that the primary concern of the "contemporary community standards"
part of the obscenity test was that material be assessed in terms of its im-
pact on a reasonable person, except insofar as the material was directed at
a particular "deviant group." '26 In such a case, the material was to be judged
by its impact on the group to which it was directed.'27 If the material ap-
pealed to the prurient interests of its intended audience, regardless of whether
it also appealed to the prurient interests of the average person, the material
could be classified as obscene.
On the authority of these cases, child pornography could have been held
to be obscene. Depictions of young boys masturbating probably would not
appeal to the prurient interests of the average person. Yet, it is not irra-
tional to conclude that child pornography is produced for, and primarily
purchased by, people who find such depictions to be erotic. Because material
that appeals to the prurient interests of its intended audience is harmful and,
therefore, unprotected by the first amendment,' 28 child pornography could
have been held to be unprotected speech.
Under this proposed rationale, states could ban child pornography and
accomplish all of the goals of the New York statute at issue in Ferber. This
proposal has the further advantage of being consistent with precedent because
suppression of child pornography would be justified by the harmful effects
of the speech on its audience. This is not to say that this proposal is free
from problems; however, the problems that would arise are those that already
inhere in the Court's definition of obscenity. For example, it is at least con-
ceivable that some people would buy child pornography for purposes other
than sexual arousal and, for such people, the material would not be obscene.
Nevertheless, a person who sells a magazine depicting minors engaged in
123. Id. at 639. In addition to the state's independent interest in protecting the welfare of
children within its boundaries, the Court held that the right of parents to rear their children
also justified the law. Because most parents would not want their minor children to be able
to buy sexual materials, parents are entitled to support from the legislature in keeping such
material from their children. Moreover, parents who do want their children exposed to such
material can buy the material themselves and give it to their children. Id.
124. Id. at 643. Because obscenity is unprotected, laws regulating obscenity need only be
rational in order to be valid. Id. at 641. For a discussion of the rational basis test, see supra
note 24. The Court found this law to be rational because, even though scientific studies on
the issue of whether obscenity is harmful to children were inclusive, laws need not be scien-
tifically accurate to be rational. 390 U.S. at 641-43; cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
383 (1957) (law banning sale to the general public of sexual material harmful to minors held
not rationally related to state interest).
125. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
126. Id. at 33. The Miller Court distinguished between the "average person" and "a par-
ticularly susceptible or sensitive person-or indeed a totally insensitive one." Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 76-102 and accompanying text.
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sexual activity cannot be required to inquire into the sexual preferences of
everyone seeking to buy the magazine. If the harm of obscenity is its appeal
to prurient interests, theoretically, a magazine seller should ask everyone who
buys any material relating to sex whether the material appeals to the pur-
chaser's prurient interests, and refuse to sell the material if the purchaser
answers in the affirmative. This, however, would be unrealistic and the Court
seems to have accepted this inherent flaw in its obscenity decisions.
Another problem with this proposed rationale is that it would classify more
material as unprotected than the Court did in Ferber. Specifically, the pro-
posal would allow suppression of a book that described, in words alone,
minors engaging in sexual conduct. The statute involved in Ferber would
not allow suppression of such a book because children would not have been
exploited in its production. Yet, the proposal would allow suppression of
the book because words, as well as pictures, can appeal to prurient interests.
Nevertheless, this expansion would be insignificant when compared to the
range of previously protected material that could fall within the scope of
the Ferber rationale, as demonstrated by the preceding discussion.
CONCLUSION
Until Ferber, the Supreme Court decisions on the issue of unprotected
categories of speech revealed a consistent and universally applied principle.
This principle was that speech was so highly valued by American society
that it should be suppressed only when there was a danger to society posed
by the speech itself. The Court applied this principle to allow suppression
of advocacy of illegality which caused the audience to take illegal action,
of deceptive advertising which caused consumers to be defrauded, and of
obscenity which caused corruption of morals. In each instance, it was the
speech itself that caused the harm, and the societal interest in preventing
the harm justified suppression of the speech.
In contrast, the Ferber Court was willing to allow suppression of speech
without even considering whether the speech had a harmful impact on its
audience. Instead, the Court allowed suppression of the speech to prevent
a harm that occurred in its production. Consequently, the Ferber principle
permits suppression of speech that, in and of itself, might be constitution-
ally protected. Moreover, Ferber was an unnecessary expansion of the govern-
ment's censorship powers because the same result could have been reached
merely by holding that child pornography was obscene. If freedom of speech
is subordinated to other interests, and the government is permitted to act
as a censor to achieve goals unrelated to the impact of the suppressed speech,
censorship ultimately will become the rule and free speech the exception.
Joan S. Colen
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